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Abstract 
 
We use a behavioraly motivated risk-return optimization framework to shed light on the important link between 
global supply chain management and investors’ risk-return choice.  By improving the transparency and 
sustainability of the global supply chain, firms can reduce the probability of extreme losses, thus increasing 
investors’ expected utility and asset valuations.  In order to efectively address the growing risks firms face in 
their global supply chains, systemic change is required.  Managers can facilitate this change by increasing 
transparency and sustainability of their supply chains, especialy in the area of carbon emissions reduction.We 
outline existing programs and tools that are leading the way in this regard. 
 
Keywords:Supply chain, ESG factors, risk, return 
 1. Introduction 
 
The importance of supply chain management (SCM) in afecting a firm’s operating and financial performance and 
creating economic value for its shareholders has long been recognized (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005;Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2003;Hertzel et al., 2008; Altay & Ramirez, 2010;Ou et al., 2010;Swink et al., 2010;Elinger et al., 2011; 
Johnson & Templar, 2011; Meford, 2011).We contribute to this literature by highlighting the role of sustainable 
and transparent SCM in reducing the volatility of expected asset returns as it is perceived by individual investors. 
When investors perceive lower asset risk, trade-ofs between investor-specific behavioral volatility and expected 
asset returns improve thus increasing investors’ expected utility and firms’ valuations.  Firms with the most 
sustainable and most transparent supply chainsare likely perceived as least risky and most valuable with the 
potential to replace the government as the safe haven in times of crisis. 
 Instead of using the variance of the return distribution, we focus on investor-specific behavioral volatility as 
developed by Davies and de Servigny (2012), henceforth DdS. A behavioral approach improves upon traditional 
financial models in that it ofers a more realistic measure of asset volatility, taking into account non-normality of 
asset return distributions as wel as important diferences in how individual investors perceive asset risk. We use 
this approach to suggest that the risk-reducing efects of SCM on asset return distributions may help address 
concerns regarding the continued existence of a sovereign risk free asset. Instead of looking for alternative safe 
havens in gold or other commodities, investors might look to safer firms for a refuge from risk. Disclosing and 
improving firm risk profiles to make themobservable and valued by investors may also improve the signaling 
function of asset prices and returns.  The resulting fund alocations are likely to not only increase investors’ 
expected utility,but also improve the economy’s ability to prosper and reduce the need for government crisis 
management.  
 
The paper is organized as folows.  The next section outlines the behavioraly motivated utility optimization 
framework in the context of the global economy in which observers question the assumption that sovereign debt 
wil always be risk free, and shows that alternatives may be found.  Section 3describes the need for a systemic 
(universal) shift towards sustainable and transparent SCM,if asset volatilities are to decline. Section 4 highlights 
the risks and costs of carbon as an example of areas on which supply chain managers may choose to focus. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The Behavioraly Motivated Model 
 The recent financial crises in the U.S. and in Europe have renewed concerns about some of the assumptions built 
into generaly accepted models of traditional finance theory, such as modern portfolio theory (MPT), the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), and the eficient markets hypothesis (EMH). In their search for beter investment 
management practices, DdS identify three problems associated with the traditional MPT that need to be 
addressed. First, due to the great diversity of investors’atitudes towards risk, the risk-return framework needs to 
be completely subjective.  Not only do investors difer with respect to their predictions of future return 
distributions, but they also difer with respect to their perceptions of the same future return distribution prediction. 
Second, the quadratic utility function employed by the traditional MPT displays increasing absolute risk aversion 
and increasing relative risk aversion, with especialy the former being contrary to observed investor behavior. 
And, finaly, the quadratic utility function implies that investors care only about the mean and variance of a given 
return distribution while ignoring al other moments. This assumption would make sense if al return distributions 
were Gaussian (normal), but most empirical tests conducted by DdSand others suggest this is not the case (see, for 
instance, Chapter 4 in DdS, and MSCI, Inc., 2009).Without abandoning MPT altogether, DdS suggest changes to 
the framework so that individual preferences are recognized, while behavioral biases and errors are understood yet 
excluded from the optimization process. In other words, the framework is built to optimize the rational long-term 
preferences of individualinvestors, and it alows for the fact that most asset returns are not normaly distributed by 
recognizing asymmetries and fat tails.1 
 To improve upon the quadratic utility function used by the traditional MPT, DdS define utility as a function of log 
returns on initial wealth, and identify the exponential function as more suitable.  A rational long-term utility 
function must be smoothly increasing in wealth (return) and exhibit concavity, because more is preferred to less 
and investors are averse to risk.  The exponential function, beyond fulfiling al the requirements for a rational 
long-term utility function, is the only utility function that exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)and, 
therefore, decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) when log returns are used, which is more plausible given 
observed investor behavior. Utility, for the exponential function, is zero for zero returns, exponentialy decreasing 
for negative returns, and increasing at a decreasing rate for positive returns. Thus the exponential utility function 
is consistent with an aversion to both negative skewness and fat tails in the return distribution. The risk aversion 
built into this utility function increases with lower degrees of the investor-specific risk tolerance.  
 The analysis of DdS then folows the traditional MPT in that the maximization of expected utility is replaced with 
a search for the optimal risk-return choice. This requires the decomposition of expected utility into two metrics, 
expected return and a risk measure that is independent of expected return.  However, in the behavioraly 
motivated model of DdS, which abandons the unrealistic assumption of normaly distributed asset returns, risk is 
no longer equal to the return variance.The higher distribution moments now mater. Furthermore, the behavioral 
risk measure, while consistent with rational long-term decision-making, is now subjective.  In the traditional 
MPT, investor-specific subjectivity is limited to the individual investor’s preferences regarding the trade-of 
between objective measures of expected return and variance. In contrast to the assumed “representative investor” 
of traditional finance theory, actual investors differ greatly with respect to their risk tolerance, which influences 
their perceptions of how risky a particular asset is. They may perceive diferent amounts of risk being associated 
with a given return variance, or with a given non-normal return distribution. Addressing these shortcomings of 
the traditional MPT, DdS add a behavioral component to the rational utility maximization framework and alow 
for non-normal return distributions with higher distribution moments. In their behavioraly motivated model, risk 
is defined as the investor-specific behavioral variance, σB2, using the folowing approximation:2 
 
 σB2 ≈ σ2 (1 -  skew +  kurtosis) (1) 
 
 
                        
1 For purposes of this paper, we are concerned only with single-period optimizations.  DdS also address the problem of 
dynamic rebalancing as new information is incorporated into the return distribution predictions over time, but this problem is 
beyond the scope of our paper.  
2 The formula is an approximation, because the much smaler efects on behavioral risk of the infinite number of higher 
moments of the distribution functions are ignored. See Chapter 5 in DdS (co-authored with Shweta Agarwal) for a derivation 
of this result. 
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where σ2 is the return variance and T is the individual investor’s degree of risk tolerance.  Kurtosis, in this 
equation, is normalized by subtracting 3 so that skewness and kurtosis are zero when the return distribution is 
normal.  In this special case, the behavioral risk measure equals the return variance, and the behavioraly 
motivated model converges to the traditional MPT. 
 The behavioral risk measure thus generalizes the optimization of the trade-of between expected return and risk, 
while retaining a focus on rational long-run investor preferences.  This more general risk measure alows for 
diferences among individual investors precisely where these diferences arise.  The variable T is inversely 
associated with both skewness and kurtosis, indicating that investors with high risk tolerance perceive litle risk 
arising from the characteristics of return distributions that are represented by these two moments. Investors with 
low risk tolerance, on the other hand, exhibit a great deal of loss aversion, and tend to be very sensitive to 
relatively high probabilities that are atached to extreme losses or gains when return distributions are negatively 
skewed and leptokurtic. The degree to which risk perceptions are influenced by individuals’fearsand hopes varies 
greatly across investors, and this variety is incorporated in the behavioral variance measure. 
 In the MPT, the assumed existence of a risk free asset alows investors to construct a portfolio with less risk than 
the eficient portfolio of risky assets ofers. While this, in theory, is appealing, the MPT criticaly depends on the 
availability of a proxy for the risk free asset.  Recent research has raised questions regarding the continued 
suitability of sovereign debt securities to serve in that role.Xiang and Qian (2012) and Damodaran (2010; 2008), 
for instance, discuss the causes and efects of a market perception that default by governments in the U.S. and 
Europe is no longer impossible.This perception may be explained with market participants’ realization that 
advanced economies have experienced record increases in “fiscal stress” in recent years as documented by 
Baldacci et al. (2011).Rising sovereign debt levels combined with the sense that austerity measures are needed to 
contain them, have raised deflationary risks. The loss of credibility by the credit rating agencies in the wake of 
the 2007-2009 crisis has highlighted the difficulty of tracking these risks.  While gold has, at times, been 
suggested as a substitute for sovereign debt, recent evidence does not support gold’s use as a safe haven asset in 
the past, casting doubt on the metal’s future ability to serve in that role (Joy, 2011).With a new proxy for the risk 
free asset not readily identifiable, a sense that nothing is risk free seems to be spreading (Sommer, 2011). 
 Damodaran (2010) predicts some possible consequences if investors are unable to identify an asset with a certain 
return:  A reduced investor wilingness to take risks would likely lead to lower asset prices.  As a result, firms 
would borrow less and pay lower dividends.  Inevitably, this would lower economic growth, which may be 
exactly what advanced economies need to help them stay within the nonnegotiable limits imposed by a finite 
planet (Jackson, 2011). Thus, the outcome would not necessarily be al negative. In fact, increased competition 
for reduced funding may improve the quality and lower the risk of the projects that are ultimately financed.  
 Some of the observed long-term trends suggest at least the possibility that this may be the direction in which we 
are heading (see, for instance, Table 1.10 on p. 27 and Table 6.1 on p. 186 in DdS). As the populations of the 
Western economies are aging, the demand for safe assets wil increase even as the supply of safe assets appears to 
be shrinking.  This creates an opportunity for borrowing entities (municipal governments and businesses) that, 
through “real economy” as opposed to “financial” innovation, are able to reduce the risk associated with a given 
expected rate of return (Doheny et al., 2012).  Selected companies with the highest credit ratings have already 
benefited from lower financing costs than the U.S. Treasury. Examples are the short-term yields of Exxon and 
Johnson and Johnson, which recently dipped below the yields of comparable U. S. Treasury securities(McGee & 
Burne, 2012). 
 An important area in which innovation can lower risk, as measured by the behavioral volatility, is management of 
the global supply chain.SCM has been shown to afect firms’ risk, financial performance, and financing costs. 
Perceived reductions of firm risk would make corporate securities more atractive and lead to higher asset 
valuations (Elinger et al., 2011; IBM Global Business Services, 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Hendricks 
& Singhal, 2005;Hendricks & Singhal, 2003).  Firms that improve their disclosure of relevant information and 
implement practices that lower the frequency and severity of losses associated with SCM,likely shift investors’ 
eficient frontier to the left and alow investors to achieve risk-return combinations similar to those that would 
exist if a truly risk free asset were available (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: SCM May Improve Investors’ Risk/Return Choice without a Risk Free Asset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 To support the risk-reducing efects of “real economy“innovation, it may be necessary for firms, investors and 
consumers to make significant changes in long-established paterns of behavior, and for governments to facilitate 
these changes by creating the appropriate legal and regulatory infrastructure.The next section outlines the need for 
systemic change, and the steps that have already been taken in this direction with the universal adoption of a new 
focus on ESG (environment, social and governance) factors. 
 
3. The Need for Systemic Change 
 The importance of identifying and managing risks in the supply chain - both the upside as wel as the downside of 
uncertainty - has been widely recognized in the academic and professional literature (Doheny et al., 2012; 
Mefford, 2011; Rao & Goldsby, 2009; IBM Global Business Services, 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008; 
Staufer, 2003).  Recent events, such as the earthquake and tsunami in Japan and Hurricane Sandy in the U.S. 
have heightened the sensitivities of investors to downside risk in the environment. Fires in Bangladeshi factories 
are examples of extreme social risks. Transparency enhances awareness and facilitates accountability. For firms, 
the United Nations Global Impact and Business for Social Responsibility (2010) ofer some practical suggestions 
to help improve supply chain sustainability.  More recently, researchers at the Massachusets Institute for 
Technology have developed a “social network for supply chains” termed Source map that alows firms to connect 
with their suppliers and coordinate action in the event of crisis. 
 In order for global SCM to significantly reduce asset return volatilities - however measured - it is not enough for 
firms and investors to focus on supply chain sustainability and transparency.  The behavior of al agents in the 
global economy wil have to change simultaneously. Firms that disclose and reduce risk exposures in their global 
supply chains need investors to reward them with fund alocations, and they need consumers to make informed 
and responsible choices.  To help investors and consumers identify responsible firms, government policy must 
formulate appropriate disclosure requirements that enhance transparency.Recent eforts by governments and 
economic agents al over the worldreflecta growing awareness that ESG (environment, social and governance) 
factors are critical drivers of our progress as a civilization. However, it is difficult to identify a set of practical 
recommendations for firms, investors, consumers and governments along these dimensions because of the great 
variety of approaches and the lack of generaly accepted standards. 
 While standardized measures for ESG factors have yet to be developed, international organizations have launched 
initiatives to lay the foundation for global standards of operation and governance. In 1997, the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) was created by the Coalition for Environmentaly Responsible Economies (CERES) in 
conjunction with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  GRI represents the first atempt at 
establishing a global framework for comprehensive reporting of the “triple botom line,” i.e. business results from 
a financial, environmental, and social perspective.  Other prominent standards include the Caux Roundtable 
Principles, the Global Sulivan Principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the Bench 
Marks (Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility). The rising number of ESG initiatives worldwide reflects 
a growing global concern with these issues. Even greater awareness and more widespread action are needed. 
 In connection with the Carbon Disclosure Project, for instance, Topping (2012) and Jira and Toffel (2011) outline 
ways in which the disclosure of environmental information encourages changes in the practices and behavior of 
corporations, investors, regulators and other stakeholders. 
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The Natural Capital Declaration, The Cambridge Natural Capital Programme reports (2011a;2011b) and The 
2050 Criteriapublished by the World Wildlife Fund (2012) al are manifestations of increasing levels of 
awareness among business leaders and investors regarding the immense sources of value associated withour 
ecosystems that, in the past, have been largely ignored. Emerging efforts aim to recognize and measure the value 
that the atmosphere, natural capital and biodiversity contribute to the sustainability of human life and health. This 
trend promises to reduce the environmental degradation and the destruction of natural habitats that, in the face of 
increasing population growth worldwide, threaten to result in resource shortages, price volatility, as wel as 
elevated levels of climate and political risks. 
 Addressing social risks in the global supply chain is consistent not only with protecting and enhancing a firm’s 
reputation and intangible asset value but, more broadly, is a requirement for sound labor relations and stable 
societies.  Eforts to build a sound social infrastructure include, for instance, the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act of 2010 (SB 657), which aims to combat slavery and human traficking.  Doorey (2011) 
documents individual companies’assessments of the risks and benefits associated with factory 
disclosuresthataddress the use of sweatshops, child labor and other types of forced labor in their supply chains. 
Emerging and unresolved issues surrounding farm animal welfare are raised in Sulivan et al. (2012).These and 
similar eforts to broadly address social issues in firm decision-making share a concern that the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is often alowed to supersede the goal of preserving human life and health, 
which depend criticaly on the health of animals and our natural environment. In 2000, the United Nations Global 
Compact speled out ten principles covering critical issues in the areas of human rights, labor, the environment 
and anti-corruption that, by now, have been signed and agreed upon by more than 10,000 participants from 
around the world. 
 As global population growth and increasing world consumption are expected to apply unrelenting pressures on 
societies and the planet, a realization is growing that we need a new social contract and a sincere concern for the 
common good (Ferenbach & Pinney, 2012; Reeves et al., 2012; Bekefi et al., 2006).  If a more 
inclusiveapproachwith a view towards optimization for alis adopted, then disclosure and transparency of global 
supply chains become necessities.With supply chain dependencies no longer hidden from public view, financial 
gains for shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders wil become increasingly dificult to achieve and 
justify. On the other hand, shareholders wil be able to benefit from a reduction of previously hidden risks. One 
of the largest areas of uncertainty encompasses the physical, regulatory and political dimensions of climate risks. 
Important initiatives to report and address these risks have been launched, for example, by the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) with its Climate Disclosure Standards Board and its Supply Chain Program. 
 
4. The Risks of Carbon 
 A particularlychalenging area of SCMthat promises opportunities for advancing systemic change, while 
simultaneously improving investors’ risk-return choices, addresses the disclosure of carbon emissions and climate 
risk management. CDP’s Supply Chain Program offers a standard global platform that facilitates reporting and 
colaboration for companies and their suppliers in eforts to reduce carbon emissions, reduce climate risks and 
generate savings from improved processes. In 2014, the program had more than 60 corporate members with more 
than 2,800 firms responding to the CDP’s information request. A relatively large proportion of firms, 38%, have 
no reported processes for identifying and managing climate-related risks.  Of the firms that have identified 
regulatory, physical, and other climate risks and report having a risk management system to address them, 78% 
integrate the issue into their overal risk management processes (CDP, 2014). The currently voluntary nature of 
this efort raises concerns about the quality of the reported information. At some point, this kind of information 
may be required, regulated, or emissions taxed nationaly and/or globaly.  These possibilities imply a business 
exposure to potentialy large contingent liabilities which most certainly need to be considered within a company-
wide risk management system. 
 The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) defines three categories of emissions: Scope 1 covers direct GHG 
emissions from sources controled by the company. Scope 2 accounts for GHG emissions from the generation of 
electricity purchased by the company. Scope 3 alows for the reporting of al other indirect emissions including 
supply chain activities. Scope 3 emissions may represent the largest category of emissions for some companies, 
and this may also be the one that is most dificult to track (World Resources Institute and World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, 2011). 
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Sourcemap, the new social networking tool for managers, helps increase transparency of the entire supply chain to 
facilitate contingency planning to prepare for natural disasters or social unrest (Brown, 2013). It also helps 
measure carbon emissions at every stage and facilitates colaboration that can lead to savings. 
 Measurement and reductions of carbon emissions are important not only to reduce the long-term physical risks 
associated with climate change, but also the regulatory dimensions of climate risk. For instance, many firms that 
participate in the reporting of GHG emissions to CDP identify the folowing types of regulatory risks (CDP, 
2013): Carbon taxes in high-energy jurisdictions, cap and trade schemes that raise operating costs due to the need 
to purchase alowances, fuel or energy taxes, environmental regulations that increase the costs of facility 
constructions, or emission reporting obligations that entail risks of enforcement action in the event of non-
compliance.  While most firms do not consider these risks an immediate threat, a longer-term approach to risk 
management justifies making emissions reduction a priority.  Over time, the political wil for regulatory 
intervention seems to be increasing (Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 2013), and so are estimates of the 
social cost of carbon which are used to determine the required magnitude of the regulatory impact. 
 The cost of carbon project, a joint efort by the Environmental Defense Fund, the Institute for Policy Integrity and 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (Howard, 2014), identifies a relatively large number of factors that were 
omited in the most recent update of the social cost of carbon study by the Interagency Working Group (2013). 
The current average estimate of the social cost of carbon per metric ton of CO2for 2015 is about $37 per year. 
The omissions, as the report points out, include hard-to-quantify impacts on a variety of market sectors, such as 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, biodiversity, health, sea level rise, and the social stability of communities. Due to 
these omissions, the current social cost of carbon estimate should be considered to be a lower bound. If this lower 
bound were translated into a tax per metric ton of CO2, the financial liability could be substantial, easily ranging 
in the hundreds of milions of dolars per year for a given firm based on currently reported Scope 1, 2, and 3 
emissions.  Clearly, managers face strong financial incentives to establish processes for regular reporting and 
emission reduction efforts along their entire supply chains, which frequently span multiple international 
jurisdictions. In the face of anticipated increases in carbon emissions and climate risks worldwide, investors are 
likely to pay very close atention to the extent to which this potential for risk reduction is realized by individual 
firms. 
 
5. Summaryand Conclusion 
 A rapidly growing global population and rising levels of consumption are posing unprecedented threats to the 
atmosphere, the environment, communities, and governments.  Successfuly managing scarce resources, in the 
face of these ongoing chalenges, requires major adjustments to traditional paradigms, concepts and management 
tools.Beter informationdisclosure about ESG risks in business supply chains,and an increased awareness on the 
part of CEOs and Boards of Directors regarding their roles in protectingthe atmosphere and human rights,and 
valuing ecosystemsare important starting points. When progress along ESGdimensions is driven simultaneously 
by firms, investors, consumers and governments,beter supply chains are likely toreduce behavioral volatilities 
and improve investors’ risk-return choices, asset valuations and resource alocations.  This kind of success 
iscriticalin an increasingly complex and interconnected worldthat faces the risks of climate change, in which 
every asset is risky and safe havens are temporary at best.  Success may ultimately mean that the worst of al 
possible outcomes wil have been avoided. 
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